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The airline industry is energy intensive, has high ﬁxed costs and its demand is very sensitive to the economic
cycle. After the industryworldwide undergoes deregulation, starting with the United States in 1978, two distinct
businessmodels develop. Traditional carriers operate hub and spoke networks, offer onboard service and engage
in price discrimination, whereas low cost carriers operate point to point, charge for all services and have simple
tariffs. TACA begins operations in Central America in 1931 and, by 1943, has a footprint that extends from the
United States to Argentina. In 1998–2001 TACA faces increased competition and a signiﬁcant market downturn.
In 2004 TACA CEO Roberto Kriete launches Centroamérica Fácil to stimulate air trafﬁc in the airline's base
countries.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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1. Introduction
“As Central Americans, we are proud of TACA's effort to reactivate
the region's economy and to stimulate better relationships between
our communities. ‘Centroamérica Fácil’ [Central America Easy] responds
to the users' needs; we are here to serve them.”Mr. Roberto Kriete, CEO
of the Grupo TACA airline, says these words in a speech in October
2004 at the launch of ‘Centroamérica Fácil’.
As he leaves the presentation, Mr. Kriete ponders on the challenge
TACA presents to Central American authorities. If you allow passengers
to make it through Immigration faster, and establish reasonable airport
fees, and if TACA reduces fares signiﬁcantly, passenger trafﬁc in Central
America can increase substantially. He also reﬂects on whether TACA
has the conditions to become a low cost carrier.
Air transportation is turning one hundred years old. History shows
man's desire to ﬂy. In 1903 Orville and Wilbur Wright build a machine
that ﬂies 120 ft in 12 s. After much testing and prototyping, in 1914
the ﬁrst programmed ﬂight takes place in Florida and, in 1915, the
precursor of Boeing comes to be. During World War I, aircraft produc-
tion increases substantially, and receives a further boost in 1925 when
the US Post Service launches air mail. 1958 sees the launching of the
ﬁrst jet aircraft, the Boeing 707.
By 2003, global passenger trafﬁc by air concentrates in North
America with 40% of the total, and in Europe with 25%. The initial
development of the airline industry is intimately linked to the public
sector as a large buyer, and in some cases, as an operator. As the industry
deregulates, airlines are forced to reconsider their businessmodels. This
process starts in the United States, but later spreads to Europe. By 2004,
Latin American markets make substantial progress towards “open
skies”, but the economics of the industry are poor and airline executives
need to think hard about their business models. This requires a
careful understanding of the competitive dynamics and the regulatory
conditions of the industry.
2. Regulation, competition and evolving business models
2.1. United States
In 1938 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) begins operations in the
United States to promote competition and to ensure that airlines offer
quality service. The CAB's role is to regulate fares, prohibit price
discrimination, and authorize routes and mergers between airlines in
the hope that these policies improve the conditions of the airline indus-
try, unproﬁtable since 1934. By the end of the 1970s, however, there re-
mains very little competition and industry performance is terrible.
Between 1950 and 1974 the CAB rejects all 80 applications from new
airlines looking to set up service, and disallows all requests made by
existing airlines wanting to enter rivals' routes. Airlines rarely reduce
airfares, because doing so requires approval from the CAB, and the
process is expensive and rarely successful (Breyer, 2004).
In 1978 the US Congress approves legislation to deregulate the
industry, which phases out over four years all restrictions to limit new
competitors, establish new routes and change fares. The expectation is
that deregulation will force incumbent airlines to become more
efﬁcient, and that prices will drop as new airlines enter the market.
In the ﬁrst decade after deregulation, major airlines focus on
developing hub-and-spoke networks. Airlines offer direct ﬂights only
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between cities that have a lot of trafﬁc, while a central hub serves lower
density city pairs. This should result in fuller ﬂights from the spokes to
the hub, as they carry passengers with several ﬁnal destinations. The
beneﬁt for the airlines is not only operational; as airlines expand activ-
ities in hub airports, they use a large part of these airports' capacities,
making it more difﬁcult for rival airlines to offer ﬂights to and from
those hubs.
As the route structure becomes more complex after deregulation,
airlines establish computer reservation systems (CRSs) and by 1992,
92% of all domestic ﬂight reservations in the United States are made
through the four largest CRSs. American Airlines' Sabre captures 43%
of the reservations market, and United Airlines' Apollo has 27%. These
proprietary systems also create a barrier for new competitors as they
give the airline that owns them preferential display on reservation
screens. CRSs also increase fare transparency to facilitate price coordina-
tion. If an airline cuts a fare, its rivals notice it almost instantly on the
CRS, which allows them to match the reduction and prevent the price
cutting airline from gaining any signiﬁcant market share. Airlines also
implement frequent ﬂyer programs to encourage customer loyalty,
and travel agent commission overrides (TACOs) to strengthen travel
agency loyalty. A TACO is a nonlinear remuneration scheme in which
the agency receives a 15% commission from an airline, instead of the
usual 10%, if it books more than 80% of its ﬂights with that airline.
Free from price regulation, airlines move to different forms of value
pricing (American Airlines, 1987). Passengers on the same ﬂight have
varying reasons to ﬂy which makes them respond differently to the
price of tickets and to service levels. Large airlines, following the lead
of American Airlines, develop sophisticated yield management systems,
which allow them to “sell the right seat to the right client at the right
price.” (Belobaba, 1987). To segment demand airlines introduce fare
classes with different levels of restrictions, such as minimum purchase
and minimum stays.
Executives at American Airlines observe that 15% of their seats travel
empty because passengers cancel at the last moment or do not show up
at all. AA is able to increase its revenue substantially by overbooking,
which means selling more seats than are available on a ﬂight. The
third element of yield management is to set limits on the number of
seats available at each fare. When an airline sells a seat at a low fare, it
loses the opportunity to sell that same seat for a higher fare. To maxi-
mize the expected revenue, the airline should only sell an additional
low fare seat when the low fare is greater than the expected revenue
of selling that seat for a higher fare (Belobaba, 1987).
All these measures lead to improvements in performance, but
deregulation cannot repair a structural weakness in the industry.
Aircraft represents important capital commitments which are made
several years in advance, while industry demand is very sensitive to
cyclical downturns. Starting in 1989, an economic recession and the
Persian Gulf War lead to dramatic drops in leisure demand, and even
business travelers cut back and become much more sensitive to prices.
Between 1989 and 1992 airlines lose close to US $10 billion. As a result,
TWA and Continental seek Chapter 11 protection, and Pan American
ceases operations altogether. Eastern, an important player in Central
and South America is forced to sell its routes to American Airlines in
1990, and American becomes TACA's main rival in ﬂights to the
United States.
Low cost carriers (LCCs) are able to weather this crisis much better
than the major airlines and start growing very rapidly thereafter. LCCs,
like Southwest, have signiﬁcantly lower costs and they are able to cap-
ture market share through low and transparent fares. They concentrate
on city pairs that have at least 100 passengers per day each way. As the
LCC group expands, it starts operating longer ﬂights. The number of
miles per ﬂight increases from 540 in 2000 to 643 in 2003 (Hansman,
2004).
Beginning in 2001, the airline industry experiences a brutal shock
from the conﬂuence of the September 11 attacks, the SARS scare, the
war in Iraq and high fuel prices. Again, the LCCs are able to remain
proﬁtable and continue gaining market share at the expense of tradi-
tional airlines. Between 1999 and 2003 American Airlines loses more
than 1.5% of its market share, while United and Delta lose 3.5% and
2.5%. Meanwhile, Southwest and JetBlue gain more than 2% in market
share each (Belobaba, 2005). With less than 10% of the market in
2004, Southwest represents more than 50% of the United States airline
industry's stock market capitalization.
Fig. 1 shows ﬁnancial and operating indicators for the entire airline
industry in the United States. Yield is the average price per mile ﬂown.
ASM is the number of times the airline moves one seat for a distance
of 1 mile. When an Airbus 321, which has 169 seats, ﬂies 300 miles,
the airline counts 169× 300=50,700 ASMs. Similarly, RPM is the num-
ber of times the airline moves one passenger 1 mile. If the Airbus 321
travels 300 miles with 135 passengers it counts 135 × 300 = 40,500
RPMs. For the above 300 mile ﬂight the capacity utilization or load is
simply 135/169 = 80%.
To ﬁnd capacity utilization or load for the entire company or for a set
of routes, airlines take the ratio of RPM to ASM. In 2003 there are 40
airlines serving 4100 airports. The average number of passengers on
each plane for domestic ﬂights is down to 90 in 2003 from 130 in
1990 (Hansman, 2004). This is due, in part, to regional airline develop-
ment feeding the main airlines' hubs.
2.2. Europe
The ﬁrst European countries to connect by air are France, Germany
and Holland. KLM, the oldest airline that retains its original name,
makes its maiden ﬂight in 1920 from Amsterdam to London. As in the
US, the airline industry is, at ﬁrst, tightly regulated, but with a twist.
Several national governments in Europe promote their airlines in
order to protect them from competition and, in some cases, stimulate
trafﬁc to colonial territories.
Deregulation of the European airline industry starts in 1987, almost
ten years after the United States. Reform makes it easier for airlines to
introduce new fares and share capacity. In 1990, third and fourth
freedoms (Fig. 2) are granted to the entire European Union (EU), and
in 1997 they add the ninth freedom. Thereafter, any airline which
establishes itself in one country can receive a license to operate in the
rest of the EU.
Low cost carriers start operating later than in the United States. The
ﬁrst one, Ryanair, begins in 1987, 16 years after Southwest. Europe's
conditions favor the rapid ramp up of LCCs. As 20% of the population
(and 24% of the gross domestic product) is packed into 7% of the territo-
ry, there are many high density city pairs. Train and auto travel are an
effective alternative to air travel, but they are relatively expensive,
especially rail.
3. Traditional and LCCs in the United States
The US offers the best account of how competition unfolds between
LCCs and traditional carriers, and clear evidence of the beneﬁts of the
LCC business model.
For all airlines, revenue frompassengersmakes up 75% of the total in
the United States. The other 25% is distributed among cargo (15%),
charges for excess baggage, penalties for date changes, etc.
In 2003 US airlines'main costs are labor and fuel. Table 1a shows the
breakdown of cost per available seatmile (CASM) for several traditional
airlines and LCCs (Southwest and JetBlue). Labor costs make up almost
40% of the large airlines' operating costs. The majority of airline
employees support unions and these obtain attractive collective
agreements, after months, or even years, of negotiation. American
West negotiates its collective agreement with pilots between 2000
and 2004. Table 1b shows detailed operating data for several US airlines.
Fuel costs dependon the aircraft's capacity and age. The cost of fuel is
the most volatile and unpredictable part of an airline's operating costs;
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see Fig. 1 for the evolution of the real cost of a gallon of fuel. LCCs
effectively engage in aggressive fuel hedging programs.
Maintenance costs increasewith the age of an airline'sﬂeet. Newair-
craft experience less wear and tear and therefore need fewer parts. Fur-
thermore, when parts are needed for the newest airplanes, the
manufacturer warranty often covers them. The number of departures
drives land operating costs. Payments for airport use, established in con-
tracts between the airlines and the air terminals, represent themain el-
ement in this category. The commission airlines pay to travel agents
decreases in the United States from an average of 12% in 1994 to less
than 5% in 2002.
Costs differ signiﬁcantly between LCCs and traditional airlines. The
operating model is an important driver of these differences. Whereas
traditional airlines continue using the hub and spoke model, LCCs
operate point to point. In the hub and spokemodel, ﬂights from several
origins are channeled to their destination through an intermediate
airport (hub). Using this model, traditional carriers are able to serve
people living in relatively small cities. LCCs in contrast use point to
point systems, which work best when ﬂying passengers between large
cities that have a lot of people moving between them. Although LCCs
have faster aircraft turnaround at airports, they do not beneﬁt from
consolidating trafﬁc at hubs.
LCCs sharemany other characteristics. They tend to use a single type
of aircraft, which allows them to reduce spare parts inventories, avoid
complex purchasing, and streamline training costs. Southwest uses
the Boeing737–200 and JetBlue theAirbus A320 exclusively. Traditional
airlines start to add regional jets, like the Embraer ERJ and the Bombar-
dier CRJ, to their ﬂeets. These jets have operating costs per ASM that are
3–4US$ cents (henceforth, cents) higher than that of anAirbus 320, and
they have only half the ﬂying range, so it makes sense to use them only
for short routes that have little trafﬁc.
LCCs also keep pricing simple, not unlike everyday lowprices (EDLP)
at supermarkets. For a givenﬂight, prices vary by how far in advance the
ticket is purchased: 14, 7 or 3 days before the ﬂight. Pricing is more
aggressive on routes with greater competition. LCCs use direct sales
channels massively, and pay low or no commissions to travel agents.
They offer only one class, keep onboard services to a bare minimum,
and generally charge for food or any extras. The obsession of Ryannair
with removing all frills leads it to introduce a ₤18 charge for the use
of wheelchairs. In 2002, it is forced to eliminate this policy after a
London County Court rules it to be discriminatory and unfair.
LCCs tend to operate out of secondary airports because it is easier to
get permits and it is often also cheaper. All of these characteristics allow
LCCs to gain a real cost advantage over traditional operators. Table 1a
shows several operating metrics and Fig. 3a shows the evolution of
revenue per available seat mile (RASM) and CASM for traditional and
low cost carriers.
Variations on the LCC model also prove to be effective. JetBlue does
not serve food on-board, but has planes equipped with leather seats
and televisions. EasyJet operates from Europe's main city airports.
At the beginning LCCs focus on connecting high-density trafﬁc cities,
which often serve as hubs for the traditional airlines. However, as time
passes, and the low hanging fruit has been picked, they begin to move
to medium- and small-sized city airports.
4. The Latin American market
There are 40 airlines in Latin America serving 580 airports
(Hansman, 2004). The largest operator is Grupo Cintra (Mexicana de
Aviación and AeroMéxico). In Central America alone there are 53
airports. By 2003, the region represents 10% of global air trafﬁc, as
volume doubles between 1985 and 2002.
As in Europe, national governments nurture and protect ﬂag airlines
in Latin America. Lagging Europe by only a few years, Latin American
countries open theirmarkets to their partners in regional tradingblocks.
Fig. 1. (a) Operating and ﬁnancial data for airlines in the United States. (b) Operating and
ﬁnancial data for airlines in the United States. (c) Operating and ﬁnancial data for airlines
in the United States. Shaded years: recession. RPM= revenue passenger mile = one pas-
senger carried one mile. ASM = available seat mile = one seat carried one mile. Load
factor = RPM / ASM. Yield = revenue/RPM. RASM = revenue / ASM. Proﬁt per ASM=
revenue/ASM – cost / ASM= RASM – CASM. Proﬁt per ASM= yield × Load – CASM.
Source: Air Transport Association.
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In 1991 theAndeanRegion implements an open skies policy through
which the airlines of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru andVenezuela ob-
tain third, fourth and ﬁfth freedoms for passengers and cargo, with no
capacity or frequency restrictions. Passenger transport for un-served
routes is automatically authorized. Service between city pairs that are
already covered is authorized only if themarket is deemed large enough
to accommodate the entrant. TheMercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay with Bolivia and Chile) sign a similar agreement
that same year.
In 1997 Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua each sign separate, but almost identical, open skies bilateral
agreements with the United States, providing market access without
any restrictions on routes, capacity, frequency, code sharing or fares.
This liberalization contributes to the rapid growth of tourism between
the United States and Central America, particularly Costa Rica, which
sees the number of US visitors double over the preceding nine years.
By contrast, within Central America strict reciprocity regardingmar-
ket access rules exploitation agreements: if a new Panamanian airline
requests a route to Guatemala, a Guatemalan company must have the
same right to cover the route to Panama. Several city pairs in Central
America are very low density. In 2004, less than 50 passengers travel
daily in each direction between San Pedro Sula and Managua, or San
José and Guatemala.
The fares of TACA and Copa, TACA's only real competitor in Central
America, are similar. Fares are high in absolute terms and very high
compared to other modes of transportation. In March of 2004 the
round trip air fare between San Jose and San Salvador of TACA and
Copa is $370, while the bus service is only $80. A study that Grupo
TACA conducts between 2003 and 2004 reveals that about 80% of pas-
sengers who use air transportation in Central America do so for busi-
ness, 15% for pleasure and the rest to visit family and friends (VFF). Of
the 80% of passengers that travel for business, 65% are corporate staff.
These clients value direct ﬂights, punctuality and convenient schedules.
They prefer ﬂights that leave early in themorning and return late in the
afternoon. About 62% of passengers buy their tickets less than seven
days before the trip.
New carriers attempt to break into the Central Americanmarket. The
WSJ reports in June 2005 that Nature Air will start offering service
Fig. 2. Freedoms of the air.
Table 1a
US Airlines cost per available seat mile 2003. (US$ cents).
SW JetBlue AA Delta United Continental US Airways
Salaries and beneﬁts 3.10 1.96 4.17 4.57 4.43 2.87 4.59
Fuel 1.16 1.08 1.59 1.40 1.65 1.24 1.10
Maintenance 0.60 0.17 0.49 0.45 0.34 0.48 0.57
Commissions 0.07 – 0.61 0.50 0.67 0.49 0.62
Leasing 0.25 0.44 0.39 0.52 0.58 0.84 0.74
Terrestrial land operations 0.52 0.50 0.67 0.62 0.69 0.58 0.61
Depreciation and amortization 0.53 0.37 0.79 0.89 0.68 0.42 0.42
Others 1.37 1.56 1.77 1.71 2.30 2.44 3.05
CASM 7.60 6.08 10.50 10.66 11.34 9.36 11.70
Average stage length (in miles) 730 1272 1,080 780 1,060 1,120 725
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between San Jose–Costa Rica and Granada–Nicaragua for $199 round
trip. In 2003 Aeropostal Alas de Centroamérica establishes itself in
Costa Rica to offer service between the Juan Santamaria airport and
neighboring countries with DC-9 and MD 82/83 aircraft, starting in
2005. In 2004 there are also reports of a joint venture between Sol Air,
a Honduran airline, and the Venezuelan Aeropostal to cover routes
between Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica (La Nación, 2004).
5. Grupo TACA
The history of TACA goes back almost to the beginning of air trans-
portation as told by Yerex (1985). In 1931 Lowell Yerex, a pilot from
New Zealand, arrives in Tegucigalpa to help General Tiburcio Carías
ﬁght a war. When the hostilities end, a grateful Carías gives Yerex a
single-engine plane to ﬂy cargo and mail within Honduras. Yerex
names his company Transportes Aéreos Centroamericanos (TACA).
In 1935 Yerex buys Guatemala's Compañía Nacional de Aviación and
the airlines belonging to Nicaragua's Empresa Palacios. In 1936 he ac-
quires a Costa Rican airline. In this way he obtains control of local routes
through autonomous companies in each Central American country. As a
result, TACA has 14 planes, 10 pilots and approximately 80 employees
(Yerex, 1985).
In 1939 TACA carries 10,000 tons of cargo and approximately
200 tons of mail, making it the largest cargo carrier in the world. After
it establishes companies in Venezuela and Colombia in 1943, TACA's
footprint extends from the United States to Argentina. Pan American,
the only company that at that time has a similar span, responds by es-
tablishing local airlines in each of the countries of Central America:
LACSA in Costa Rica, Aviateca in Guatemala and Aeronica in Nicaragua
(Yerex, 1985).
In 1945 Yerex leaves the company and sells his stock to Waterman
Steamship Company, a ﬁrm with headquarters in Birmingham,
Alabama.Waterman reduces TACA's operations in Latin America, choos-
ing instead to focus on moving cargo in New Orleans. In 1960, Ricardo
Kriete, a Salvadorian businessman, takes control of TACA El Salvador
and turns the company's focus back to developing the Central
American market. It once again competes with Pan American for
passengers traveling to the US and with the companies launched by
Pan American for regional passengers (Yerex, 1985).
The civil wars that ravage Central America at the beginning of the
1980s force many Salvadorans to take refuge in the United States.
Over time, the growing population of Salvadoran immigrants in the US
spurs growth of air travel between the two countries. TACA is careful
to encourage loyalty towards the ﬂag carrier; it offers personalized
Table 1b
US airlines, operating data.
Source: airline annual reports.
2000 2001 2002 2003
Southwest
Average daily utilization (hours) 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.1
% of sales online na na na 50%
ASM (million) 59,910 65,295 68,887 71,790
RPM (million) 42,215 44,494 45,392 47,943
Yield (US$ cents) 12.9 11.77 11.77 11.97
Average stage length (miles) 663 690 720 730
JetBlue
Average daily utilization (hours) 12.0 12.6 12.9 13.0
% of sales online na na na 63%
ASM (million) 1,371 4,208 8,240 13,640
RPM (million) 1,004 3,281 6,836 11,527
Yield (US$ cents) 8.37 9 9.46 10.12
Average stage length (miles) 825 1,152 986 1,272
American Airlines
Average daily utilization (hours) na na na 10.0
% of sales online na na na 7%
ASM (million) 161,030 153,035 165,209 172,200
RPM (million) 116,594 106,224 120,328 121,747
Yield (US$ cents) 14.06 13.28 11.86 11.91
Delta
Average daily utilization (hours) na na na 9.0
% of sales online na na na 24%
ASM (million) 154,974 147,837 141,719 151,679
RPM (million) 112,998 101,717 102,029 113,311
Yield (US$ cents) 14.06 12.08 12.74 12.73
Table 2
Direct sales. (Percentage of total sales).
Source: TACA.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Call centers 2% 3% 4% 4% 6%
TACA centers 10% 13% 12% 12% 11%
taca.com – 0% 0% 2% 4%
Total 12% 16% 16% 18% 21%
Table 3
TACA capacity and market share by route 2003.
Source: TACA.
ASM (million) % ASM Market share
CAM-CAM 804 13% 62%
CAM-NAM 3777 63% 42%
SAM-CAM 604 10% 28%
SAM-SAM 843 14% 10%
Total 6028 100% 29%
Fig. 3. a. Traditional airlines vs. LCC. US domestic operations. In US$ cents. Source: U.S. Jet
Transportation Industry. b. LCC market share. Source: U.S. DOT Database and Eurocontrol.
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service and shows great solidarity when an earthquake hits San
Salvador in 2001.
In 1992 TACA acquires stakes in LACSA and Aviateca. At that time
Aviateca is a public company ﬂying from Guatemala to Miami, Los
Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, Mexico, and the rest of Central
America. Lacsa is a private company that ﬂies from Costa Rica to the
same destinations as Aviateca, but also has valuable routes to New
York, Caracas, Quito, Lima, Santiago de Chile, Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro. With the establishment of Nica in 1994 and Taca Honduras in
1996, it completes its Central American footprint, much like Yerex did
years before.
In 1997 TACA becomes Grupo TACA and starts consolidating its
operations. El Salvador serves as its hub for Central America and Costa
Rica serves as its hub for operations between Central and South
America, for which Lacsa's routes are particularly valuable. 1999 sees a
growth opportunity in the South American market that Grupo TACA
considers poorly served so it establishes a hub in Lima, Peru.
In 1997 the open skies treaty between Central America and the US
comes into effect and competition intensiﬁes. In 1998 a price war starts
with Continental and Delta for passengers traveling between theUnited
States and Central America and TACA's cargo takes a hit from the consol-
idation of UPS's cargo operations in the region. Proﬁts collapse between
1998 and 2000.
The management of TACA knows that dramatic measures are in
order. After operating in a war torn region for twenty years, they are
no strangers to adversity. The 2001 survival plan includes the following
emergency measures:
• Aggressive cost reductions by simplifying the organization. Consultants'
analysis shows alarmingly low productivity: TACA's revenue per
employee is 30% lower than the average of Latin American airlines
and almost 45% lower than the average of US airlines. Management
moves swiftly to eliminate duplicate activities and those that are
not adding value, and to improve other processes. These measures
generate US $20 million in savings and boost productivity by 47%. By
May 2002 the revenue level per employee is US $147,000.
• Turn around unproﬁtable routes or get rid of them.After carefully study-
ing all the TACA routes, they decide to eliminate 30 and improve
another 50. Fig. 4 shows TACA's routes.
• Migrate to a 100% Airbus Jet ﬂeet. In 2000 TACA has a ﬂeet with 44
aircraft: 19 Airbus 320, three Airbus 319, ﬁve Airbus 300 and 17
Boeing 737–200. By 2003 TACA has a ﬂeet of 21 Airbus 320 and
seven Airbus 319. The new ﬂeet saves about US $10 million a year.
• Increase proﬁt through improved yield management and more effective
sales channels. A benchmarking study shows proﬁts would increase
by raising fares on certain routes.
Fig. 4. TACA's route system, 2003.
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TACA carries out a detailed analysis of the differentmarket segments
it serves. It establishes new fares to match its competitors and
introduces additional restrictions regarding advance purchasing and
minimum stay that discourage business passengers from traveling on
fares designed for pleasure travelers.
It introduces new fares and implements a yieldmanagement system
to try to improve proﬁtability. TACA uses fares to segment demand and
fare seat controls to avoid selling a seat for less thanwhat is possible. For
the Managua–San Salvador route, for example, the yield management
ofﬁce establishes howmany seats will be reserved at the seven-day ad-
vance purchase fare of $450without travel restrictions, versus the lower
fare of $350 available 30 days prior to the travel date. These measures
result in a substantial increase in proﬁts in 2002.
In 1999, TACA sells 88% of its tickets through indirect channels.
Starting several years before, and at a faster pace during the crisis,
TACA's marketing focuses on developing direct sales channels. They
contract an independent call center company to offer reservation and
ticketing services for the entire Central American region, 24 h a day,
and seven days a week. They also improve the location of TACA's phys-
ical sales and customer service centers throughout their network. By
2003 there are four TACA centers in El Salvador, three in Guatemala,
two in Nicaragua, two in Honduras and three in Costa Rica. In South
America and North America there is a TACA center in every city served
by the airline. In February 2001 TACA launches taca.com to reduce chan-
nel cost even further, and it hopes that internet saleswill soon gain trac-
tion (Table 2). TACA expands its frequent ﬂyer program, ‘Distancia’,
which dates back to 2000.
After implementing all these emergency measures TACA's CASM
drops to 9.3 cents. Close to 45% of CASM corresponds to ﬂight opera-
tions, 11.2% to land operations and 10.7% to sales and publicity. Flight
operation costs are those associated with fuel and crew payments.
Land operations are payment for airport use and services offered
externally in the loading area, such as cleaning, technical support and
baggage administration. Direct maintenance represents 8.4% of CASM,
administrative expenses 7.8% and passenger services 4.4%, indirect
maintenance 1.7%, 1.7% depreciation and amortization, and 9% other
expense items.
The average distance traveled by a carrier's aircraft is known as
average stage length (ASL). In 2003 the ASL for TACA is 1059 miles.
That year, TACA uses its aircraft 12 h per day.
Table 3 shows the composition of air trafﬁc between and within
different sub-regions of the Americas from 2000 to 2004. TACA carries
60% of the passengers traveling between Central American cities,
while Copa carries most of the remainder. TACA carries 43% of the pas-
sengers traveling between Central andNorth Americawith a substantial
lead over American and Continental. Copa again competes with TACA
for passengers traveling between Central and South America, but on
these routes its market share is almost twice that of TACA.
6. Centroamérica Fácil
The metrics of air travel in Central America in 2003 are poor. Only
20% of people traveling within Central America do so by air; of those,
most travel for business. Most worrisome for TACA is the load factor of
only 56% on ﬂights within Central America.
OnMarch 18, 2004 TACA launches Centroamérica Fácil to try to solve
this problem. The program is designed to stimulate air travel within Cen-
tral America by lowering the total cost of traveling by air, that is, the sum
of airfare and the cost of time used to get through airports at both ends of
a voyage. To be effective, the initiative requires a joint effort by TACA and
the governments of the region. TACA reduces and simpliﬁes fares. The
Central American authorities are supposed to improve immigration
and customs processes to allow passengers to get out of airports faster.
In order to get a sense of the market's elasticity TACA conducts a
pilot plan to reduce fares between March and May on three routes:
SJO–SAL, MGA–SAL and SJO–GUA. On the SJO–SAL route the reduction
in fares generates enough trafﬁc to leave revenue essentially un-
changed. The SJO–GUA leads to 10% higher revenue, while the MGA–
SAL leads to 10% lower revenue.
To save passengers additional time at airports, TACA allows them to
check in 24 h before their ﬂight. At the same time, the company begins
negotiations with the region's governments to introduce simpliﬁed im-
migration for Central American citizens. They hope to achieve a system
similar to that in Europe where EU citizens just hold up their passports
as they walk through immigration.
Mr. Roberto Kriete, President of the Board and CEO of TACA, states at
the time of the program's launch: “TACAmade this truly innovative de-
cision after taking measures to reduce costs and simplify procedures.
Another factor is the growing demand we have experienced this year
as a consequence of increased business travel, newmarketing initiatives
to promote regional tourism, the FTA negotiations and the political
stability we now have in our countries.”
Appendix A
A.1. TACA HRO Analysis
Between 1998 and 2001 TACA airlines confront a particularly dire
combination of events that endangers its proﬁtability. A price war
with US carriers threatens margins on ﬂights connecting Central
America and the United States, demand on Central American routes is
weak as a result of the economic recession, cargo revenues collapse as
a result of consolidation in the sector, and the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, reduce demand for air transportation and increase
costs. As a result, TACA proﬁts collapse at the end of 2001.
TACA confronts these circumstances through a commitment to resil-
ience, one of the characteristics of a Highly Reliable Organization. TACA
rises to the challenge by implementing a program to regain proﬁtability
and position itself for the future: i) the company conducts a study of its
operations which leads to the elimination of 30 unproﬁtable routes and
the restructuring of another 50 routes; ii) TACAmoves to a 100% Airbus
ﬂeet in order to standardize procedures, reduce spare parts inventories
and the cost of training pilots.; iii) encourages new channels; iv) en-
hances revenue management policies; and iv) reduces cost by simplify-
ing the organization. All these measures allow TACA to turn a proﬁt by
the end of 2002 and achieve a substantially lower breakeven load. The
company is able to recover from the crisis and learn from it, an
important characteristic of HRO (Weick et al. 1999).
Yet even after an impressive turnaround, TACA demonstrates that it
is not satisﬁed with short term achievements and seeks to consolidate
its position through its Centroamérica Fácil program, which creates
value for its customers and develops its home base market. Although
perceived value is subjective, as it varies between cultures, places and
time periods (Sanchez et al., 2006), academic studies on air transport
generally deﬁne perceived value as “the evaluation that a client makes
of the utility of a product or service, based on the perception of what
is received and what is given in exchange” (Zeithaml, 1998). According
to this deﬁnition, the client's perception of the value of an airline de-
pends on the tradeoff between the price of the ticket and the service
the airline gives, in terms of waiting time in airports, punctuality and
the convenience of schedules (Bieger et al., 2007). TACA attends a lei-
sure segment, which reacts mainly to the price of the ticket, and a busi-
ness segment, which attaches value to the level of service the airline
provides, and the convenience of its schedules. In order to attract price
driven passengers, TACA implements a plan to reduce and simplify air-
fares on all its regional routes. It establishes a single airfare applicable to
tickets purchased on certain ﬂights, seven or more days before the
ﬂight. For service driven passengers, TACA looks to enhance the travel
experience, reduce waiting times in air terminals and allow advanced
check-in, up to 24 h before the ﬂight. It also initiates negotiations with
the governments of the region to simplify and expedite immigration
and customs procedures for Central American passengers. Alliances to
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enhance perceived value, with governments or with ﬁrms in the same
or other industries, entail risks, but assure the survival of an airline in
the longer term (Kleymann and Seristö, 2001). TACA understands that
to maintain and expand its market position, it has to improve its value
proposition.
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Appendix B
B.1. TACA Teaching note
The airline industry is energy intensive, has high ﬁxed costs and its
demand is very sensitive to the economic cycle. Traditional carriers
and low cost carriers differ in their operations and costs and in the
way they adjust to downturns. TACA operates as a traditional carrier
in markets with different degrees of deregulation. The company
overcomes the dire circumstances of 1998–2001 by streamlining oper-
ations and increasing revenues which shows a commitment to resil-
ience, a characteristic of Highly Reliable Organizations. Through the
Centroamérica Fácil initiative, TACA seeks to increase value for its cus-
tomers through lower tariffs and less total travel time, but density in
Central American city pairs does not allow for point to point operation.
Keywords: Airlines, Deregulation, Central America, Business models
B.2. Introduction
B.2.1. Case overview
The case is set in October 2004 when Roberto Kriete, CEO of TACA,
launches “Centroamérica Fácil”, an initiative to stimulate air trafﬁc in
Central America through a joint effort between his company and the
governments of the region.
Airline regulation seeks to ameliorate the industry's poor perfor-
mance, but ends up making things worse. Deregulation stimulates the
creation of hub and spoke networks, which lead to greater utilization
of capacity as ﬂights carry passengers traveling to many different city
pairs. Deregulation is by no means complete. In Latin America, TACA's
market, some intra-regional routes are still subject to exploitation
agreements which limit entry and discourage competition.
After TACA's proﬁt collapse in 1998–2001, the company reacts by ag-
gressively cutting costs, eliminating unproﬁtable routes and ﬁne tuning
its pricemanagement system.As the situation improves in 2004, the com-
pany evaluates its strategy and launches the Centromérica Fácil initiative.
B.2.2. Teaching objectives
• Discuss the competitive dynamics of an industry subject to high ﬁxed
costs, high energy intensity, and that varies sharplywith the economic
cycle.
• Evaluate alternative business models for airlines and establish their
feasibility under different market environments and geographies.
• Discuss howa highly reliable ﬁrm reacts to adverse circumstances and
establishes the foundation for long term success.
B.3. Discussion questions
Discussion of this case can be suitably organized around the ﬁve
questions that follow. Each question should take between ten and
ﬁfteen minutes, leaving another ﬁfteen minutes for conclusions.
B.3.1. Characterize the long term performance of the airline industry and its
adjustment to periods of recession
The airline industry measures volume in revenue passenger miles
(RPMs), and we measure capacity in available seat miles (ASMs).
Since deregulation, volume increases by a factor of 3.2 and capacity by
a factor of 2.6. Capacity utilization, the ratio of RPM to ASM (i.e. load
in the airline business), increases from 50% to 75% (Fig. 1a). Meanwhile,
yield falls dramatically in real terms (Fig. 1b). Fig. 1 shows the effect of
the economic cycle on US domestic airlines. During recessions demand
drops and, since airlines have difﬁculty in adjusting supply, yields fall
and load factors fall only moderately. In 1990–91, even though fuel
prices increase almost 25% as a result of theGulfWar, real yields actually
drop and load falls by only two percentage points. The same drop in load
occurs during the 2001 recession, when yield declines as the price of
fuel again increases, but from a much lower level. The severe 1980–82
recession is an exception to this pattern. The oil shock of 1979 sends
fuel prices sharply higher making lower real yields impossible and the
load factor falls by ﬁve percentage points.
Fig. 1c shows how the proﬁt per ASM of US airlines varies over the
cycle. Proﬁts drop sharply in recessions, especially in the period follow-
ing September 11. A common misapprehension is that “planes ﬂy
empty” during this period. The collapse of proﬁt is actually associated
with declining margins rather than falling volume.
B.3.2. Contrast the performance of US traditional and LCCs during the 2001
recession. Use Fig. 3a. How does RASM change for American Airlines (AA)
and Southwest (SW) from 2000 to 2002? Why? RASM = yield × load
Fig. TN-1 comes from Fig. 3a and shows that the proﬁt per ASM for
LCCs is consistently between 0.5 and 1.5 US$ cents permile (henceforth
cents). As the recession hits, LCC RASM drops but remains above CASM,
whereas traditional carrier RASM drops substantially, leading to losses.
From2000 to 2002 theRASMof AA falls by 1.54 cents, and that of SW
falls by 1.33 cents. This drop in RASMmust reﬂect a drop in yield and/or
in load. Interestingly, for AA yield drops by 2.20 cents, with a very small
change in load. This is the type of adjustment to lower demand
discussed in relation to Fig. 1. For SW, yields drop only 1.13 cents, but
load falls 5%.
As SW is the LCC, should not its yield drop more than that of AA
following a fall in demand? This apparent anomaly disappears
when one remembers that traditional carriers engage in sophisticat-
ed price discrimination, making business customers pay higher
prices for the privilege of returning home on a Friday, or for getting
more ﬂexibility on reservations. As the economy worsens, willing-
ness to pay for these beneﬁts falls and traditional carrier yields
collapse. Yields for traditional carriers are, therefore, pro-cyclical be-
cause price dispersion is pro-cyclical (Cornia, Gerardi and Shapiro,
2010). Yields for LCCs change less over the cycle as they follow a
policy similar to EDLP for supermarkets. This is also consistent
with LCCs' decision not to participate in online travel marketplaces
(Sin, Chellappa and Siddarth, 2011).
B.3.3. Contrast the costs of traditional carriers and LCCs. Why are they
different? Which group does TACA belong to? Plot airline CASM against
ASL. What do you ﬁnd? You can control for the effect of ASL by calculating
cost per equivalent seat mile (CESM) as recommended by the US Depart-
ment of Transportation. Using Southwest as an example: CESMSW =
CASMSW ∗ (ASLSW / ASLbase)0.5 Since the focus is on TACA, use TACA as the
base.
Fig. TN-2 shows the relation between CASM and ASL. Three things
are apparent. First, airlines with longer ﬂights have lower CASM. Longer
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ﬂights mean that ﬁxed costs are spread over more ASMs and also mean
lower fuel expense per ASM, because aircraft spend more time cruis-
ing rather than taking off and landing. Second, for a given ASL, LCCs
have lower CASM than traditional carriers. The ASL of Southwest
and US Airways are almost the same, but the CASM of Southwest is
about 4 cents lower. Third, TACA appears to have the costs of a tradi-
tional carrier.
Fig. TN-2 shows that Delta and American have a similar CASM. As
American operates longer ﬂights its costs should be lower than those
of Delta. Table TN-1 shows CESM, which is CASM adjusted for distance
using the DOT formulae. The unadjusted CASM is also shown for com-
parison. Since the ASL of Delta is below that of TACA, its CESM is lower
than its CASM, and the opposite is true for American. The CESM of
both airlines is very similar.
Among LCCs, the ranking of Southwest and JetBlue is reversed when
JetBlue's advantage from greater ASL is adjusted for, which is consistent
with the fact that JetBlue offers some frills.
Table TN-2 contrasts the CESM of LCCs with those of traditional air-
lines. The average cost disadvantage of traditional carriers relative to
LCCs is 3.59 cents. The main driver of this difference is labor costs,
which originate from greater levels of unionization. The row, other,
which includes depreciation amortization and other ﬁxed charges, is
higher for traditional carriers because hub operations tie up their air-
planes. Delta operates its aircraft 9 h/day, compared to 11 for Southwest
and 13 for JetBlue. Traditional carriers spend0.55 cents on commissions,
whereas LCCs rely completely on direct channels.
Land operations and fuel each represent 0.25 cents of cost differ-
ences. LCCs try to use secondary airports with lower fees and have
aggressive fuel hedging programs, which are often successful. The
LCCs' cost advantage due to maintenance is only 0.10 cents, lower
than one would expect from having a common ﬂeet. A closer look
at Table TN-1 shows that this is driven by the high maintenance
cost of Southwest, which has a common, but very old ﬂeet. The
maintenance cost advantage for JetBlue is 0.25 cents, in line with
land operations and fuel.
Table TN-2 conﬁrms that TACA's CESM is in line with that of a tradi-
tional carrier. The cost structure, however, is rather different. TACA's
main disadvantages when compared to the average traditional carrier
are in commissions, land operations and maintenance, each of which
represents 0.45–0.50 cents. TACA's online sales are very low compared
to Delta and American, but the company is working to improve them.
TACA is very conscious of the high cost of land operations and is trying
to convince governments to reduce them through the Centromérica
Fácil program. TACA is in line with LCCs and has a considerable advan-
tage compared to traditional carriers in other, which represents various
ﬁxed costs. Although TACA operates a hub and spoke system, the com-
pany is able to keep its aircraft in the air 12 h a day, 1 h more than
Southwest.
B.3.4. Characterize the markets in which TACA operates. What measures
does TACA adopt to avoid bankruptcy in 2001?
Fig. 4 shows that TACA is a network carrier with hubs in San
Salvador, San Jose and Lima. TACA operates in very different markets.
Table 3 shows that 63% of TACA's capacity is deployed on the CAM–
NAM routes, and that the CAM–CAM routes, where the company
originates, represent only 13%.
In 1999 TACA starts serving the SAM–SAMmarket through its hub in
Lima. SAM–SAM is as large as CAM–NAM, but TACA's share is only 10%.
In the CAM–CAM routes, TACA has a 62% share. Restrictions to entry on
these routes remain, and TACA shares this market with Copa. TACA's
participation is also fairly high in the CAM–NAM routes, but this market
is wide open to competition through the liberal bilateral agreements of
each country with the United States.
In 2001 TACA realizes that drastic measures are in order to avoid
bankruptcy. The company implements measures to reduce cost and
increase revenue. The immediate closure of unproﬁtable routes and
the elimination of redundant positions are stop gap measures
which have a rapid impact on cost. The move to a 100% Airbus ﬂeet
should lead to signiﬁcant savings over time in maintenance ex-
penses, which are 0.50 cents above the average for traditional car-
riers. Internet sales are expected to continue growing, but they are
still small compared to TACA centers which are especially attractive
to corporate clients.
B.3.5. What is TACA trying to achieve with the Centroamérica Fácil
Program? Can TACA become a LCC?
By 2004, TACA feels that it is time to rationalize rates in Central
America. Section B.3.3 shows that commissions, maintenance and
land operations are higher than for other traditional airlines. As
TACA depends on business travelers the company is likely to contin-
ue using travel agencies and increasingly use the TACA Centers.
Maintenance costs should fall as the company exploits the beneﬁts of
a 100% Airbus ﬂeet. Land operation expenses, however, are amongst
the highest in the world and previous attempts to negotiate lower
fees failed.
Why not tie the two things together? If the governments of the
region accept the Centroamérica Fácil challenge, TACA can continue
improving its costs position, and any positive impact of lower prices
will be magniﬁed if travelers, especially busy executives, waste less
time at airports.
Section B.3.3 shows that TACA has the costs of a traditional carrier.
Moreover, routes in Central America have nowhere near the density
required for a point to point operation, with only three city pairs with
more than 100 passengers traveling each way every day. Though trafﬁc
might expand with lower fees, the results of the pilot study are not
sufﬁciently encouraging.
B.4. Epilogue
In 2009TACA andColombian carrier Avianca announce theirmerger,
creating the largest airline of Latin America. The following year they
start reorganizing and integrating their route networks. In 2012 they
join the Star Alliance, the largest group of network carriers in the
world. The 80 year old dream of Yerex, of an airline ﬂying from the US
to Argentina, remains alive.
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Fig. TN-2. Cost and distance ﬂown.
Table TN-1
Cost per equivalent seat mile (CESM). US$ cents
SW JET
Blue
AA Delta United Continental US
Airways
TACA
Salaries and
beneﬁts
2.57 2.15 4.21 3.93 4.43 2.95 3.80 2.78
Fuel 0.96 1.18 1.61 1.20 1.65 1.27 0.91 1.40
Maintenance 0.50 0.19 0.50 0.39 0.34 0.49 0.47 0.94
Commission 0.06 - 0.62 0.43 0.67 0.51 0.51 0.99
Land
operations
0.21 0.48 0.40 0.45 0.58 0.86 0.61 1.04
Other 2.01 2.66 3.27 2.76 3.67 3.54 3.38 2.13
CESM 6.31 6.66 10.60 9.15 11.35 9.63 9.68 9.28
CASM 7.60 6.08 10.50 10.66 11.34 9.36 11.70 9.28
Table TN-2
Cost per equivalent seat mile (CESM). US$ cents
LCC Traditional Trad-LCC TACA TACA-LCC TACA -Trad
Salaries and
beneﬁts
2.36 3.86 1.50 2.78 0.42 (1.09)
Fuel 1.07 1.33 0.25 1.40 0.33 0.07
Maintenance 0.34 0.44 0.10 0.94 0.60 0.50
Commission 0.03 0.55 0.52 0.99 0.96 0.45
Land operations 0.34 0.58 0.24 1.04 0.69 0.46
Other 2.34 3.32 0.99 2.13 (0.20) (1.19)
Total 6.49 10.08 3.59 9.28 2.79 (0.80)
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